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POLITICS AND PERSONALITIES IN THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
Christopher L. Eisgruber"
Michael Gerhardt's latest book, The Federal Appointments Process, examines
historically both the politics and procedures employed by the president and
Congress in selecting, and ultimately appointing, judicial nominees. In this book
review, Professor Christopher Eisgruber focuses on some of Gerhardt's most
salient observations and illustrates the degree to which the historical trends
Gerhardt describes impact current appointment practices.
Michael Gerhardt's wonderful new book, The FederalAppointments Process,'
should change the way people talk about political appointments in the United States.
Too often critiques of the appointments process combine nostalgia with moralizing.
They lament the passage of a golden era when the process was apolitical, and they
urge today's politicians to emulate the more virtuous examples set by their
predecessors. Through sober political science and meticulous historical research,
Gerhardt destroys the myth of an apolitical appointments process. His work makes
clear that the crucial question about the American appointments process is not
whether it should be political, but how it should be political.' In the pages that
follow, I summarize a few basic lessons we should take from The Federal
Appointments Process, and then attempt to draw some preliminary inferences from
the evidence, observations, and proposals Gerhardt assembles.
One fact emerges with special clarity from Gerhardt's highly readable treatment
of the historical record: the American appointments process, including the process
for appointing federal judges, has been fraught with partisan political controversy
since the nation's inception. Lawyers ought to understand this point already, if only
because that most famous of constitutional cases, Marbury v. Madison,3 resulted
from the Federalist Party's effort to pack the judiciary on the eve of Thomas
Jefferson's inauguration.4 Commentators on the appointments process seem,
though, either to forget the facts behind Marbury or else to regard them as
aberrational. They accordingly have much to learn from Gerhardt, who makes clear
that political controversy overjudicial nominations pre-dates even Marbury. When
President George Washington nominated John Rutledge of South Carolina to serve
* Director, Program in Law and Public Affairs and Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor
of Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School and University Center for Human Values,
Princeton University.
1 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2001).
2 Id. at 254-58.
3 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 52.
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as Chief Justice, the Senate blocked the appointment on political grounds: although
Rutledge himself was a Federalist and enjoyed Washington's support, Federalist
Senators deserted himbecause of his opposition to the Jay Treaty with Britain.5 His
nomination was defeated by a vote of fourteen to ten in 1795.6 Rutledge thereby
became the first Supreme Court nominee to suffer rejection by the Senate, and
Gerhardt shows that the process has remained political ever since. Gerhardt reaches
the same conclusion as other leading historians and political scientists: "It is...
beyond question that throughout U.S. history presidents and senators have been
concerned about the social or political ramifications of judicial nominations."7
More importantly, Gerhardt makes clear that the persistently political character
of the American appointments process is not the product of mischievous behavior
by rogue politicians, but rather is rooted deeply in the American constitutional
structure. Gerhardt's key observation is stunningly simple: the United States
Constitution has a single Appointments Clause which governs all major
appointments8 :
[The President,] ... by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.9
This clause applies horizontally - that is, it applies across government functions,
to ambassadors, cabinet secretaries, and judges. In practice, and perhaps as a matter
of constitutional requirement,"0 the clause also applies vertically within the judicial
branch: lower court judges are subject to precisely the same nomination and
I Id. at 51-52.
6 Id. at 51.
' Id. at 215 (citation omitted). For a review of the political science and history literature
on the point, see TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSEOF A POLITICALCOURT 85-93 (1999).
8 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 39-42.
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
"0 It is debatable whether lower court judges are "inferior officers" within the meaning
of the Appointments Clause; if so, then Congress would presumably have statutory authority
to vest their appointment elsewhere than in the president, or to dispense with the need for
Senate confirmation. Compare Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69
B.U. L. REv. 273, 323 (1989) (contending that lower court judges are indeed "inferior
officers"), with Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on
the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 275 n.103 (1992) (contending that lower court
judges are not "inferior officers").
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confirmation procedure applicable to Supreme Court justices.
The fact that the American Constitution has only one Appointments Clause is
the sort of fact that everybody knows but nobody appreciates. Gerhardt draws
attention to it and, once he does, it becomes apparent that this feature of the
American Constitution is both unusual and important. There is no obvious reason
why identical procedures should govern the appointment of a district court judge,
an ambassador to Luxembourg, and the secretary of defense. Indeed, many foreign
constitutions provide a complex array of appointments procedures to meet the needs
of different positions. For example, in the Constitution of the Fifth French
Republic, Article 8 sets out a procedure for the appointment of ministers; Article
56 sets out a very different procedure for the appointment ofjustices of the Conseil
Constitutionnel; and Article 64 sets out yet another procedure for the appointment
of the members of the Conseil Superieur, who then play a complex role in the
appointment of French judges."
If the American Constitution had a more highly differentiated appointments
process, it might have insulated some appointments from political pressures. For
example, it would be possible, in principle, to choose district court judges through
something like a civil service examination. The existence of a unitary appointments
procedure means that all appointments will be subject to roughly the same pressures
and incentives. The initial nomination will be made by one elected politician, the
president, and it will be subject to review by another body of elected politicians, the
Senate. If vesting these politicians with power to appoint other policymakers had
resulted in an apolitical process, that development would have been astonishing.
In fact, as we have already noted, the process has been thoroughly and consistently
political.
The Constitution's political appointments process serves a valuable purpose.
Appointed officials exercise considerable discretion and power. There are thus
serious questions of principle and policy at stake in nominations, and these ought
to be publicly debated. The need for public deliberation about judicial nominees
is, if anything, even greater than the need for public deliberation about executive
branch officials. 2 Judging is not a matter of purely technical expertise. For
example, William Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens are among the smartest and
most able lawyers one could hope to meet, but they interpret the Constitution very
differently. Once appointed, a new judge (unlike a new cabinet secretary) can serve
for life, unsupervised by any elected official. It therefore matters enormously
" For a thorough account of the French processes for appointing judges, see John Bell,
Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757 (1988).
2 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 258-59. Gerhardt reports that, as an historical matter, "the
Senate defers far more to a president's nominees for executive offices than to his nominees
to judicial offices, particularly to the Supreme Court." Id. at 162 (citation omitted). In my
view, those divergent standards of deference are entirely reasonable.
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whether a new judge will be more like Rehnquist or more like Stevens, and it is
absurd to suppose that presidents should ignore such differences. It is equally
absurd to suppose that senators should simply defer to a president's choices. The
political stakes in who gets appointed to the federal bench are large, and such
nominations are appropriate matters for public deliberation and debate.
For these reasons, we should welcome the public political contests entailed by
the Constitution's unitary appointments procedure. In Gerhardt's words:
The rough-and-tumble of institutional, partisan, and interest group
efforts to establish dominance over federal appointments is a natural
consequence of the allocation of power in the present system; it is the
price of having a constitutional scheme for making appointments of
which politically accountable authorities are in charge."3
Of course, there is a risk that the political character of the appointments process
will undermine the independence and the integrity of the judiciary: presidents and
senators might seek to stock the Supreme Court, and the federal bench more
generally, with judges who are pledged to a particular ideological or partisan
platform. Yet here again, constitutional structure comes into play and shapes the
political debate in desirable fashion. The Constitution has only one Appointments
Clause, but the appointments process cannot be wholly separated from the removal
process. The Constitution guarantees federal judges life tenure: they serve "during
good Behaviour."'4 This constraint upon removal radiates backward into the
appointments process. Although the president and the Senate may try to extract
promises from judges as conditions for nomination and confirmation, they have no
power to enforce those promises. 5 Moreover, because judges serve for so long, it
is not even clear what promises presidents or senators should want from them: the
issues and party divisions that arise ten years down the road may bear no
resemblance to those that exist when a judge first takes the bench.
Finally, both life tenure and the Senate's participation in the appointments
process help to reduce the likelihood that judges will regard themselves as the
personal agents of the presidents who appointed them. Different appointments
procedures could produce different incentives. For example, in France, the
president of the Fifth French Republic, the president of the National Assembly, and
I !d. at 258-59.
'4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
'5 The impossibility of enforcing promises is not always sufficient to deter politicians
from extracting them. For an example, see the exchange between Senator Joseph McCarthy
and Justice William J. Brennan at Brennan's confirmation hearing, as reprinted in WALTER
MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, & SOTiRios A. BARBER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 472-77 (2d ed. 1995).
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the president of the Senate each appoint one justice to the Conseil Constitutionnel
every three years. There is no confirmation requirement, and justices serve for nine
years. The French system's division of appointments among three competing
political officials seems to presuppose that thejustices should be "nominated (albeit
without specific instructions) to ensure that the interests of the nominating group
are fully considered."' 6 As a result, there is a risk that the justices will develop
specific constituencies: appointing officials will feel themselves entitled to select
partisan loyalists, and the justices will regard themselves as representing the
particular officials or parties who chose them.'7
In my view, then, fights such as those about Robert Bork and Lani Guinier,
which have provoked much criticism of the confirmation process, should be
regarded as (on balance) healthy. People quite reasonably disagree about whether
Bork and Guinier should have been confirmed, and about whether the candidates'
views were accurately depicted by politicians and the press. Yet, for our purposes,
what matters most is that in both cases the public debate was tied to a substantive
and important question of policy: in Bork's case, whether the Supreme Court
should aggressively protect individual rights; in Guinier's case, how the interests
of minorities should be protected within the political process. There is no doubt
that presidential appointments can affect the direction of policy on questions of this
kind, and there is no reason that the president should have unfettered discretion to
do what he likes. The intellectual quality of the debates may not have lived up to
the standards academics prefer, but then political argument never does. 8
Nevertheless, Gerhardt's careful history of the appointments process suggests
that real problems exist within it. Some of the most troubling behavior arises not
in the great public battles over the most prominent and controversial nominees, but
in less conspicuous skirmishes conducted outside the media spotlight. The evidence
compiled by Gerhardt shows that the confirmation process often operates as a
vehicle not for public deliberation about policy issues, but for conflict between
16 Bell, supra note 11, at 1783.
17 For a useful discussion of the appointments system for the Conseil Constitutionnel and
its effects on the court, see id. at 1783-86. Bell concludes that while "nominators have
frequently been concerned about having their [views] reflected [by their appointees], other
expectations about the role and tasks of the Council have prevented its becoming a
straightforwardly partisan political body." Id. at 1786. See also ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF
JUDICIALPOUTICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONALCOUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
8-10, 50-52, 234 (1992) (discussing the politics of judicial appointments and performance
in France).
8 Although the Bork hearings were far fromperfect, I tend to agree with Ronald Dworkin
that "[t]he argument and discussion of the hearings were often of extremely high quality -
foreign visitors who tuned in were astounded - and were sometimes, as during a long
Saturday morning discussion between Bork and Senator Arlen Specter, of academic depth
and rigor." RONALD M. DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 278 (1996).
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individual senators and the president, or even between two or more different
senators. Gerhardt's exhaustive documentation of such battles is one of the many
valuable contributions made by his book. Especially stunning is what he reveals
about Jesse Helms. According to Gerhardt, by 1999 Helms had "bottled up 493 of
President Clinton's ambassadorial and other foreign relations nominations."' 9 This
number is mind-boggling. Indeed, it is so large that one suspects that Gerhardt, who
devotes separate chapters to major players (such as the Senate, the president, and
the news media) in the appointments process, could have given Helms a chapter all
to himself.
The phenomenon is by no means limited to Helms. Senate rules give individual
senators tremendous power to block nominations. Individual senators have the
"prerogative... to put any nomination on indefinite hold"2 and may also resort to
other tactics, including filibusters, to prevent confirmation.2' While no other
senator has abused these devices so outrageously as Helms, they are easily and
regularly used as weapons for partisan bickering and personal retaliation. The
dynamic is neatly illustrated by Gerhardt's description of a tit-for-tat battle that
unfolded in 1997. It began when "then-Senator Carole Moseley-Braun, a Democrat,
put a hold on President Clinton's nomination of Joe Dial" for reappointment to the
Futures Trading Commission.22 Texas Senator Phil Gramm struck back by putting
a hold on two judicial nominees from Moseley-Braun's home state of Illinois. The
other senator from Illinois, Richard Durbin, countered by stalling the Republican
Party's education bill. Eventually, President Clinton placated Gramm by
nominating a Republican to succeed Dial on the Commission.23
Sometimes senators manipulate Senate procedures as part of much larger
strategies. For example, Gerhardt documents a general slow-down orchestrated by
the Republican Party with regard to the Clinton Administration'sjudicial nominees.
"By the end of 1997, the average number of days from nomination to confirmation
or final vote in the Senate was 212, the longest such average for any administration
in American history."24 "In contrast, the corresponding [numbers] for [the] Reagan
and Bush [Administrations] were 65 and 120, respectively."25 Nominations delayed
became appointments denied: the percentage and numbers of Clinton judicial
nominees confirmed established record lows. 26
Unlike the publicly reported controversies over Bork and Guinier, these
delaying tactics, whether deployed by a single senator or through a party-line
19 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 65.
20 Id. at 140.
2 Id. at 143.
22 Id. at 140.
2 Id. at 140-41.
24 Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 167.
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strategy, involve little or no public deliberation. Indeed, when one senator stops an
obscure appointment, public accountability is at a minimum. The senator, after all,
has a mandate only from the majority of voters in a single state. The senator's
opposition to a candidate may be more personal than principled. Senators may use
their prerogatives to help political friends or harm political enemies, as Senator
Helms almost certainly did in his crusade to prevent Walter Dellinger from serving
as assistant attorney general of the Office of Independent Counsel.27
To make matters worse, it is unlikely that senators will be held accountable for
blocking a nomination without a full vote by the Senate. Even when the nominee
is well-known and the office involved is important, the public's interest in most
nominations is very limited.28 That fact was underscored by the brouhaha over
President Clinton's nomination of Massachusetts Governor William Weld, a
Republican, to be Ambassador to Mexico.29 Senator Helms refused to schedule
hearings on the nomination. Governor Weld was nationally prominent (he had been
mentioned from time-to-time as a possible presidential candidate); American
relations with Mexico are obviously important; and, what's more, Senator Richard
Lugar, another prominent Republican, publicly rebuked Senator Helms.
Nevertheless, "the public showed little concern or interest in the fate of [Weld's]
nomination. The position at stake was not one about which Americans apparently
had much concern."3 Weld eventually asked Clinton to withdraw his nomination.3
Of course, to some extent, these events are typical of congressional practice in
general. With regard to legislation as well as appointments, senators may exercise
considerable power through filibusters and other dubious procedural prerogatives, 32
and more often than not the public will pay no attention - indeed, the public may
find the personalities of the appointments process more riveting than the gritty
details of policy-making.3 There is, however, an asymmetry in the appointments
process that exacerbates the incentives for bad behavior by senators: with regard
to any particular appointment, the personal stakes (for the nominee, the president,
and for senators) will vastly outweigh the policy stakes. There will always be
another candidate, more or less equally qualified, available to fill a government
post. It is possible to have an argument about whether Derek Jeter is uniquely
suited to be the shortstop for the New York Yankees,34 but it would be just silly to
27 Id. at 152.
28 Id. at 172.
29 Id. at 138-39, 191-92.
3 Id. at 192.
31 Id. at 139.
32 See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.REv. 181 (1997)
(analyzing some of the tactics permitted by Senate rules).
" I owe this observation to David Strauss.
34 The affirmative case is summarized in Murray Chass, Money Can't Measure Jeter's
Value to Yankees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2001, at D6. I
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suggest that anybody is "uniquely qualified" to be, say, a federal circuit courtjudge
- there are a lot of good lawyers, and getting a judicial nomination is inevitably a
matter of luck, connections, and so on. So, for example, William Fletcher (whose
nomination to the Ninth Circuit was the subject of a nasty political fight and who
was confirmed only after an unusual political deal)" was an excellent lawyer and
very well qualified to be a circuit courtjudge, but it would be absurd to suggest that
only he was able to serve as a judge - if Fletcher cannot serve, there will be
somebody else to take his place. On the other hand, it certainly mattered to Fletcher
himself, to the president, and to Fletcher's friends that he in particular (rather than
some other excellent lawyer) be appointed to the bench. The appointments process
therefore provides senators and the president with opportunities to inflict personal
damage upon political opponents while plausibly claiming that they have not
eliminated any particular policy option.
In light of these incentives and the unappealing practices they have spawned,
there appears to be a serious defect in the constitutional structure of the
appointments process. As we have already seen, it is clear enough (whether one
likes the practice or not) why the Senate should have the power of advice and
consent on appointments: there is no reason why the president should have
unfettered discretion to make politically controversial appointments. But what
purpose is furthered by giving individual senators - or, for that matter, the Senate
as a whole - the power to block appointments without ever putting the nomination
to a formal vote? That power, of course, is not explicitly granted by the
constitutional text; it is instead the product of Senate rules together with an
ambiguity in the constitutional text which permits (though it certainly does not
compel) the inference that Senate inaction is tantamount to rejection of a
nomination. The Constitution treats the presidential veto power quite differently:
Article I, Section 7 provides that "[i]f any Bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the
Same shall be a Law."36 I am inclined to think the country would be better served
if the Senate's confirmation power were subject to a similar, if perhaps longer (say,
four weeks), time limit. The Senate could then reject nominees only on the basis
of a publicly recorded majority vote, not on the basis of an individual senator's
prerogatives. Such a reform would not be perfect, of course; many confirmation
fights would still be uninteresting, and the Senate might develop practices to evade
the requirement (for example, by casting votes in deference to the prerogatives of
individual senators). Still, one suspects that accountability would improve if
senators were forced to go on the record with their positions about nominations in
order to reject them."
35 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 139-40.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
37 See GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 298-301 (discussing reforms of this kind).
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Gerhardt's thorough review of the appointments process suggests another
serious concern, and this one applies both to very public confirmation battles and
to more obscure ones. Gerhardt notes the existence of"a modern trend (dating back
to at least the 1970s) in which senators have significantly increased the proportion
of high-level political nominations they have opposed.""a It would appear that the
Senate is not only increasingly prone to reject nominees, but also more inclined to
do so on grounds related to personal integrity. In the pages of Gerhardt's book one
finds many stories of distinguished public figures whose nominations were felled
during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s after allegations of immoral or illegal behavior.
Examples include: Theodore Sorenson, accused of using secret documents when
writing about the Kennedy administration; 9 Douglas Ginsburg, accused of smoking
marijuana;4 John Tower, accused of womanizing and excessive drinking;4' Robert
Gates, accused of improprieties in the Iran-contra scandal;42 Zoe Baird, Michael
Cams, and Kimba Wood, all accused of hiring illegal aliens or failing to pay social
security taxes;43 Anthony Lake, accused of failing to prevent inappropriate fund-
raising;" John Ralston, accused of an extra-marital affair;45 and Herschel Grober,
accused of a potential conflict-of-interest in connection with an investigation that
had cleared him of a sexual harassment charge.46 To this list we can now add Linda
Chavez, whose nomination foundered after disclosures that she had housed, and
perhaps employed, an illegal alien."7
Gerhardt does not say whether the confirmation process has become more
focused on questions of personal integrity. I might be mistaken to suppose that it
has; perhaps I am, in this regard, myself guilty of the nostalgia which seems to
infect so many critiques of modern-day appointments practices. Nevertheless, the
numerous battles over personal character reported in Gerhardt's study are, at a
minimum, suggestive of a trend, and it is irresistible to speculate about why such
a trend might have developed, whether it is a good thing, and what (if anything)
ought to be done about it. With regard to causes for the trend, Watergate looms
large. Constitutional theorists sometimes look upon the Watergate crisis as a
violent but temporary squall, one which the ship of state weathered without
significant damage, thanks in no small part to the prescient design of the generation
38 Id. at 168.
'9 Id. at 169.
40 Id. at 196.
4' Id. at 150.
42 Id. at 169.
41 Id. at 195-96, 170.
41 Id. at 170.
41 Id. at 185.
46 Id. at 166.
47 Steven A. Holmes & Steven Greenhouse, Bush Choice for Labor Post Withdraws and
Cites Furor of Illegal Immigrant Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at Al.
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that created it. It is indeed remarkable that, nearly two hundred years after the
Constitution was drafted, its procedures proved capable of bringing about a
peaceful, mid-term presidential transition in the midst of an unprecedented scandal.
It is a mistake, however, to suppose that Watergate left no lasting marks upon our
political life. There is considerable evidence that the crisis changed both our civic
culture and our political practices so that people now care more about the personal
morality of politicians." We are caught up in what Frank Anechiarico and James
B. Jacobs have called "the pursuit of absolute integrity," in which, through special
prosecutors and other means, we are constantly investigating the ethics of public
officials."9 The tendency of the appointments process to focus on the personal
character of nominees is one instance of this more general pattern.
Should we welcome or lament this trend? The answer will depend upon one's
broader understanding of politics. There is, of course, nothing good to be said
about immoral behavior, and rarely anything good to be said about illegal behavior.
Moreover, most Americans believe that personal morality is an essential element
of political leadership, although they are divided about how much weight to give
it.5" On the other hand, "[i]f men were angels, no government would be
necessary."'" Because candidates and public officials are only human, none are
unblemished. There is thus a risk that, as the focus upon personal character
intensifies, essential policy-making activities will be displaced by endless
government investigations.5 2
48 See, e.g., FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE
INTEGRITY: How CORRUPTION CONTROLMAKES GOVERNMENTINEFFECTIVE XI, 24 (1996);
PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: HOW THE
ETHICS WARS HAVEUNDERMINEDAMERICAN GOVERNMENT,BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 47-48,
68-72 (1997); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY
AND-FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II 200-01 (1988).
49 ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 48, at 24-25 (describing a repertoire of
surveillance techniques used, after and partly because of Watergate, to control public
officials).
" Exit polls from the November 2000 presidential election disclosed that 34 percent of
voters believed that the president's "ability to provide moral leadership" was more important
than his "ability to manage the government," while 60 percent believed the opposite. Robin
Toner & Janet Elder, An Electorate Largely Split Represents a Race So Very Tight, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at B1.
11 THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For a
probing reflection on the connection between Madison's insight and the American reaction
to Watergate, see Robert A. Goldwin, Of Men and Angels: A Search for Morality in the
Constitution, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 24-41 (Robert H.
Horwitz ed., 1977).
52 See, e.g., ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 48, at XVII ("the present-day
anticorruption project is committed to forms of disciplinary control that nurture and
exacerbate bureaucratic pathologies and make fundamental public administration reform all
but impossible").
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For better or worse (and I suspect it is for worse), we may be locked in a spiral
leading to ever greater scrutiny of nominees' personal ethics. The force driving that
trajectory results from the asymmetry mentioned earlier: in appointments
proceedings, the personal stakes can be huge while the policy stakes are modest.
As a result, Washington insiders cultivate grudges over incidents the general public
quickly forgets. For example, most Americans (even those who read a newspaper
daily, and that is a distinct minority) have never heard of John Roberts, and they are
not upset that his appointment to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was
blocked by Democratic senators. As Gerhardt reports, however, Republican
Senator Charles Grassley recollected the incident quite keenly, and he later exacted
pay-back by stalling the nomination of Merrick Garland to the court for "well over
two years."" Of course, Garland undoubtedly had his own friends in the Senate.
They will remember what Grassley did and perhaps seize the opportunity for
revenge when it arises. And there is nothing special about Roberts or Garland:
anybody who is sufficiently well-connected to receive a nomination from the
president, and then to draw fire from enemies in the senate, is likely to have some
friends in the senate too.5'
This dynamic also plays out on a grander scale. Even though nearly all
observers now regard the congressional investigation into Watergate as fully
justified, some Republican Party insiders harbored continuing resentments about the
way their leaders were treated during the episode. Two decades later, they relished
the opportunity to turn the tables on Democrats during the scandals of the Clinton
Administration." It is hard to believe that committed Democrats will feel
differently about the attacks on their own officials. The public in general may soon
forget the impeachment proceedings against Clinton, or consider them justified, or
recollect them as diverting political entertainment. Those who experienced the
episode personally, however, are likely to feel a continuing bitterness.
5 GERHARDT, supra note 1, at 189.
Some people might consider the Senate fight over John Ashcroft as another case in
point. When George W. Bush nominated Ashcroft for the position of Attorney General,
Ashcroft's opponents criticized him for his own successful campaign to stop the confirmation
of Ronnie White, whom Bill Clinton had nominated for a federal judgeship. The Ashcroft
debate, however, strikes me as different from the Roberts/Garland contretemps for three
reasons: first, Ashcroft had led the opposition to White in the Senate (whereas Garland had
not played any similar role with respect to Roberts); second, the fight over Ashcroft (who was
eventually confirmed) focused for the most part on substantive issues of policy; and third, the
Ashcroft controversy led the national news for weeks. In that respect, the debate about
Ashcroft was much more like the Bork or Guinier episodes than the Roberts or Garland
episodes. The basic details of the controversy are reported in Alison Mitchell, Senate
Confirms Ashcroft as Attorney General, 58-42, Closing a Five-Week Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2001, at Al.
" Alison Mitchell, Will the Gentleman Yield a Minute to Bipartisanship? No!, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1998, at B1.
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Ideally, politicians would put the national interest ahead of partisan loyalties,
forget their grievances, and so end the destructive cycle of investigation-and-
reprisal. It seems naive, though, to hope that real people will be so magnanimous
in their reaction to personal attacks that have destroyed careers and subjected well-
meaning individuals, on both sides of the political aisle, to national embarrassment.
A dramatic national crisis (such as a war or an economic depression) could unify
the country and induce public officials to bury their hatchets. Before the tragic
events of September 11, 2001, it seemed obvious that, in the words of Robert
Putnam, "for better and for worse, America at the dawn of the new century faces
no... galvanizing crisis." 6 In the absence of any dramatic national emergency that
might lead us to forget our differences, we Americans bickered about personalities
and who should hold office. It remains to be seen whether the new "war on
terrorism" will unite the nation in a way that diminishes the partisanship over the
long run.
It is hard to know what, if anything, can be done about the (apparently)
increasingly personal character of the confirmation process. Gerhardt's excellent
book, however, at least points us in the right direction. It makes clear that we
should be arguing about how to make the appointments process political in the right
way - how to make it about policies and values rather than personalities - instead
of arguing about how to make the appointments process apolitical. It also provides
us with the resources needed to develop and test a wide range of hypotheses about
how American leaders should proceed. Gerhardt's book thus deserves the careful
attention of politicians, scholars, and anybody else interested in the American
appointments process.
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